On October 27, 1998, the BC Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of
Shuswap elder and Ts'peten political prisoner Wolverine. This final
chapter in the BC Courts' persecution masquerading as prosecution is in
direct contradiction to an earlier ruling of the BC Chief Justice inviting
just such an appeal to be made. For further information, see
ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT:
THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE SOUTHIN
THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE RYAN
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HALL
October 27, 1998
G. Wool - appearing for the Appellant
G. Fitch - appearing for the Respondent
 SOUTHIN, J.A.: The application before us, as it was amended by leave granted this morning, is first for an order setting aside the judgment of this Court pronounced the 5th February 1998 and entered upon the rolls of the Court on the 16th June 1998 in volume 228, folio 86; and secondly, for, in the words of the notice of motion, an extension of time within which an appeal may be brought.
 The grounds given in the notice of motion are these:
1. The Appellant has a bona fide intention to appeal. The motion says that in its support will be read an affidavit of the applicant to explain the circumstances together with the rulings of Mr. Justice Josephson and oral reasons for judgment by the Court of Appeal of 11th December 1997.
2. The Appellant notified the Respondent (Attorney General) within 30 days of conviction of the intention to appeal.
3. The Respondent has not been prejudiced by this extension of time.
4. There is merit to the appeal, based on reasonably arguable grounds.
5. There is an interest of justice that an extension is granted.
 The applicant was convicted in 1996, I believe - perhaps it was 1997 - on several counts of an indictment which had been preferred by the Attorney General on the 9th January 1996, arising out of what will no doubt be called in the history books of British Columbia "the Gustafsen Lake affair". The counts upon which the applicant was convicted were: one count of mischief over $5000; one count of using a firearm while committing an indictable offence; a count of discharging a firearm at peace officers with the intent to prevent the arrest or detention of persons, contrary to s.244(c) of the Criminal Code; and finally, a count #14 of using a firearm in committing the assault on peace officers, contrary to s.267(a) of the Criminal Code.
 The applicant at first wished, on his appeal, to put forward what might be called unconventional grounds of appeal by insisting on having his appeal dealt with on the single ground that this Court, and indeed the courts of Canada, had no jurisdiction over him and the other accused. That appeal was dealt with by this Court, in accordance with the desire of the applicant, on written submissions, and the Court dismissed the appeal by the order to which I have referred, and which says, as in the customary form:
This Court doth order and adjudge that the appeal from conviction aforesaid be and the same is hereby dismissed. The applicant sought leave to appeal that dismissal to the Supreme Court of Canada, which dismissed it on 14th May 1998.
 We have heard much argument here today on the question of whether this Court has any power under the Criminal Code to set aside the judgment dismissing the appeal. If the Court does have that power, then the question would become whether, so long out of time, the applicant should be permitted to bring an appeal on the grounds that he has raised in his material here.
 On this second point, the applicant attacks two rulings of the learned trial judge relating to what was to be left to the jury. One ruling has been called for convenience here the "colour of right ruling", and the other the "self-defence ruling"; although that is a misnomer, because the thrust of that argument has to do with the alleged defence not of the accused himself but of another.
 We have had some discussion about the rulings of the learned judge which are before us, and I am unable to see from what has been put before us that there was any error of any kind in the learned judge's rulings. I am of the view that there is no merit in the proposed appeal, and therefore, even if we have jurisdiction to set aside the judgment of the Court already entered, it is a jurisdiction which, in this case, I would not exercise. I would dismiss the applications.
 RYAN, J.A.: I agree.
 HALL, J.A.: I agree.