* Section 1 * Section 2 * Section 3 * Section 4 *
A logging road blockade brought me to the service of indigenous people in British Columbia. Crucial to the religious tradition of the Lil'Wat Indians of the south central interior, the region of the Whistler Mountain ski resort complex, is ancestor worship, or at least veneration. Lil'Wat Lake is a small, once crystal clear lake nestled in a valley defined by soaring permanently snow capped peaks. As an exception to the precipitous descent of the mountainsides directly to waters edge, is a tiny valley shelf on the west side of the lake. It is virtually inaccessible by land, other than to the very determined. The rays of the rising sun at first dawn happen to pierce between two of the mountains constituting the eastern frame so as, reflecting off the lake, to strike this little valley with an extraordinarily intense light, casting a glow that seems to generate from within the valley rather than strike upon it. From time immemorial the medicine people trained and were buried here. It is called by a name, unpronounceable in English language letters, that means charged with the grandeur and glory of God, the spirit - more than a graveyard, it is a shrine, a cathedral whose pillars are gigantic old growth trees and whose roof is the mountain mists.
Lil'Wat Lake is no longer clear, but rather a turgid opaque olive green from the debris from the clear cutting that my clients proved powerless to stop. Where once there were pillars are now stumps, and the rains wash the now unanchored soil of the mountainsides into the swamped shelf and choked lake. The salmon that once spawned here die here, thwarted as to life's cycle rather than after its fulfilment. When I sought in the newcomers' courts' on my clients behalf to oppose the usual injunction prohibiting protest, I literally was ordered not to refer to the constitution, on pain of being cited for contempt of court. As I went from court to court in the attempt to get one to acknowledge the existence of the issue of law going to their own jurisdiction, a pattern began whereby each subsequent court would treat its predecessors' refusal to address the law as a binding precedent that the issue had been disposed of, against my clients, on its merits. Brooking no challenges to its own jurisdiction, the court ordered lumber company archaeologists to drill three auger holes in the valley. The report was that no bones or pieces of bone turned up, but that a sardine can did. The court concluded that the valley had been used as a garbage dump rather than as a graveyard and that the Indians' allegation to the contrary was a ploy for public opinion. The injunction was issued. The appeal was stonewalled by the Chief Justice of British Columbia for six months, who refused to give an appointment at which I might settle the terms of the order granting leave to appeal. At the end of the six months the Chief Justice dismissed the appeal, on the ground that my clients were delaying and that this evidenced an intent to abandon the appeal.
Other appeals and attempts to expose the actual fraud of the Chief Justice were summarily brushed aside without the law being addressed. The Chief Justice is the same one who decided the infamous Delgamuukw case that Indians were not conceded any real rights in any event, because their aboriginal existence was too far down the scale of civilization to be accorded rights enforceable against civilized governments. "Nasty, brutish and short" he termed the Indian aboriginal condition. Accordingly, my clients from the Lil'Wat country were convicted for criminal contempt of court for continuing in the face of the injunctions to protest the irremediable devastation of their sacred valley. The criminalizing courts refused to address the law precluding and rendering criminal their own assumption of jurisdiction, on the ground that only the court issuing the injunction could address the jurisdiction issue. The fact that the two courts were one and the same, and that the law had been blindsided, was not considered as relevant as the judges' perceived need and urgency "to uphold the rule of law."
The ghostdance or sundance is the cornerstone of the plains Indians. Its adherents believe that in virtue of its rites they enter a state of grace in which they are invulnerable. I am not sure that they think they can not be killed so much as they think that the Creator has vouchsafed in them a purpose for being or a mission the significance of which transcends corporeal life. I suspect, though I do not know, that like Socrates or Christ or any of humankind's conceptual immortals they think to achieve freedom from death when death, regarded as irrelevant, is risen above in consequence of a union with a different and more profound level of reality.
John Stevens, for whom I am privileged to act as legal counsel, is one of if not the last of western North America's traditional medicine men, in whom still lives the sundance tradition. He too, like the Innu and the Lil'Wat people of whom I have spoken above, lives and thinks independently of the system of Indian government fostered by the newcomers' governments in aid of the genocidal eradication of the indigenous culture and its adherents. For this reason, he too has become targeted for criminalization and destruction. The sundance itself was made a criminal offense in 1880 as part of the illegal invasion of the Indian territories of the west.
At that time the Canadian government assumed a jurisdiction that it did not lawfully enjoy and exercised that usurped jurisdiction to create a new form of government for the Indians in substitution for the Indians' traditional forms of government. Having concentrated in camps those Indians not eradicated or expelled, the government thought to give the detainees in these perforce municipalities the benefit of municipal government. The traditional forms of government [[were]] unworkable. Being suited for administration of a free culture and people roaming at liberty their fenceless homelands, the traditional forms of government ground to a halt in the face of the fences of the concentration camps. "Chiefs" and "Band Councils" were elected as commandants and staff of the new municipal Indian governments, and paid salaries without which, given the destruction of the aboriginal economy, they would have faced starvation. To earn these salaries the new leaders reported the old leaders to the newcomers' usurping police, courts and carpetbagging lawyers to be prosecuted as criminals for carrying on the tradition of the sundance, meaning, really, for resisting. In 1950 the "law" illegally criminalizing the sundance was repealed, having served its purpose.
The sundance tradition was thought dead, or at least so suppressed as to be irrelevant. The paid Indian collaborators had done their genocidal job well, but not perfectly. Under John Stevens' tutelage the sundance revived. It was therefore to be expected that when he began to harvest the trees upon his Family Hunting Grounds the "Chief" and "Band Council" would be called upon to crush this threat that the ancient tradition might be bolstered by an economic base. The collaborators moved quickly, applying to the newcomers' court for an injunction that would preempt this new-found economic base upon which might be structured the resurgence of the traditional culture. I was retained, and instructed to apprise the newcomers' court of the legislative words that not only preclude that court's jurisdiction but render its assumption and exercise criminal. The Law Society of Alberta refused to grant me the normal occasional appearance certificate allowing me, an Ontario lawyer, to practice limited to this one case in Alberta. The Alberta judges refused to hear me address the law amicus curiae, taking the position that if I was impugning their jurisdiction I could hardly be a "friend" of the court; rather than realizing that I was alerting them to existing law in breach of which they were committing treason, fraud and genocide. One might have thought that the judges would prefer to be apprised of all the law, so as not inadvertently to commit serious crimes in ignorance. Not so.
The judges in Alberta as in Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia simply refused to address the issue of their own jurisdiction. An injunction accordingly issued, and the appeals from it summarily have been brushed aside, without the law ever being addressed.
While all these proceedings were in progress I commenced a related series of court cases in the Federal Court system of Canada, that being the system designed for cases against the federal government in particular. The basis for each case was the same.
As the federal government formally acknowledged by order in council on January 31, 1875, that government has all along been under a constitutional trust responsibility to disallow legislation pursuant to which the Indian territories have been sold to third parties before being purchased by the crown from the Indians. By this order in council the federal minister of justice approved and adopted a report of his deputy minister, and recommended acceptance of the same by the ruling cabinet. The report was that of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 when read together with the Constitution Act, 1867 (those being merely the then most current reiterations of the basis law long since settled by Sublimus Deus, 1537) required the federal government to strike down as invalid the public land legislation of British Columbia, to the extent that such legislation purported to be applicable to lands not yet purchased from the Indian tribes. Cabinet accepted the report which then, upon receiving the signature of the Governor General on the Queen's behalf, acquired the force of law. That law was never enforced. Faced with the daunting political prospect of a succession of British Columbia from the Union in protest over such an Indian victory over its (albeit illegal) provincial aspirations, the following year the federal government instead inaugurated the scheme (illegally) of leaving the provincial legislation stand, in favour of eradicating the Indian resistance to it. Thus was born the municipal government system of "Chiefs" and "Band Councils" described above.
The federal government's patent breach of constitutional trust was thus the progenitor of the ensuing era of treason, fraud and genocide against the traditionalist element within the society of the indigenous people.
In every single one of the Federal Court actions the judges said the same thing. They refused to address the federal government's breach of trust because the issue itself by necessary implication was critical of the courts constituted by that government. The judges were of course quite right as to the implication. Obviously, if the newcomers' governments have no legislative jurisdiction directly to dispossess the Indians then they have no jurisdiction to appoint courts capable of doing the dispossessing indirectly. But that is precisely how the Canadian west was "won": not, as seems familiar to United States history, by first sending in the cavalry to make war but rather by sending in the police, judges and lawyers to apply the "rule of law". Rather than shoot or bayonet the resisting Indians, in Canada the technique was, in studied judicial willful blindness to existing law, to treat the Indians' legitimate resistance as criminal insurrection, and to criminalize and punish accordingly. Rather than address the legislative words that lead inevitably to this sad and indicting conclusion, the judges of the Federal Court of Canada struck out the pleadings in which the legislation was identified on the ground that the allegations of law were "scandalous." Never mind that those allegations were, or at least might be, true. Regardless of their truth they embarrassed the court system and this was thought by these judges to be valid and sufficient grounds for suppressing the (potential if not admitted) truth.
On 6 July 1995 the Supreme Court of Canada again refused leave to appeal any of the above cases on the ground that the issue raised supposedly is not of sufficient importance to justify that Court's expenditure of time upon it.
In a related development, on 12 September 1995 the Supreme Court of Canada then refused to address the jurisdiction issue in an appeal in which leave to appeal had already been granted generally.
One of the several co-plaintiffs in the famous or infamous British Columbia case of Delgamuukw v. Attorney General retained me to apply to have the same jurisdictional question as involved in each and every of the above cases and motions stated as a constitutional question. That was the case decided by the same Chief Justice of British Columbia on the basis of the "nasty, brutish and short" philosophy of Inter Cetera, 1943, rather than upon the true law as settled by Sublimus Deus, 1537. That same Chief Justice was the same person who for six months stonewalled the Lil'Wats' appeal from the injunction destroying their sacred valley, and then dismissed the appeal as abandoned. That same Chief Justice was the person who reported me to the Law Society in an attempt to have me disbarred for seeking to effect a citizen's arrest of the judges of the Court of Appeal over which he is president, on the ground of his and their treason, fraud and complicity in genocide.
My clients' application to have the Supreme Court of Canada address the law going to jurisdiction in the Delgamuukw case was denied: first, on the ground that the issue itself had not been raised in the courts below; and, second, on the ground that the Supreme Court of Canada wanted the benefit of the lower courts' opinions and reasoning before themselves addressing the issue.
Besides, said the Chief Justice of Canada, without looking at the legislative words justifying my clients' assertion of law, their point was "preposterous," and I was "a disgrace to the legal profession" for raising it.
The Supreme Court of Canada on 6 July 1995 had just witnessed the spectacle of eleven applications raising the same issue of law. In every single one of those applications the lower courts arbitrarily had refused to address the issue of their own jurisdiction. On 6 July 1995 the Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal any of those refusals, on the ground the issue of jurisdictional law was not important. Then, on 12 September 1995, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged the importance of the issue, but said that it could not be addressed until the lower courts have addressed it. But the Supreme Court of Canada has irrefutable and overwhelming evidence from four of the provinces of Canada including British Columbia that none of the lower courts in Canada is willing to address the issue. Not only do they not address it, all they do is report me to the Law Society or cite me for contempt of court for having on my clients' behalf raised the issue.
The judicial consensus appears to be that by attempting to draw attention to the legislative words establishing the judges' treason, fraud and genocide that I am being unprofessional. They want me disbarred for professional misconduct, without the issue of law ever being addressed.
But on November 23, 1995 the Law Society refused to make the requested disbarment order and instead dismissed the some forty judicially-instigated misconduct charges. Even so, in a bizarre development the Law Society opined that I should be reprimanded in Convocation for having attempted to effect the above mentioned citizen's arrest of the British Columbia Court of Appeal Judges for their complicity in genocide. The Genocide Convention, 1948 expressly and explicitly enacts that "constitutionally responsible rulers and officials" are subject to prosecution. The police, the justices of appeal, the judges, the other lawyers, are not ready, willing and able to assist me to lay an information, though I repeatedly have tried, to prosecute the judicial genocide in the normal way.
There was no way left other than by way of citizen's arrest.
How can [[it]] be possible in a society supposedly based upon the rule of law that a bar association can acknowledge in principle the right to assert the genocide law against judges, but then to deny the right to commence legal process for bringing that charge to trial, given that that is the only way left?
Similarly, I am supposed to be reprimanded on January 30, [] for my so-called assault of the police officer who was aiding and abetting the fraudulent concealment of the above identified Nebanegwune letter.
It seems that it is forgivable for a lawyer to cite the existing law going to jurisdiction, treason, fraud and genocide but not to enforce that law. Since no one in the judicial system will help to apprehend the treasonable and fraudulent judicial genocide, the net result is that it is satisfactory to talk but not to act about preventing genocide.
While the above events were taking place one group of natives in British Columbia occupied a site on the shore of a remote lake and issued a challenge to the authorities that they would by force of arms defend their right at law to be there, at least until the government, the police and the courts agreed to address the jurisdiction issue in the constitutionally guaranteed third party court.
For this they were pilloried by the Attorney General and the police in the national media as "terrorists." The hate propaganda was so strong as completely to have blotted out the underlying issue. Those Indians unquestionably have the better right of jurisdiction and possession, and have had ever since 1537. Since 1704 it has been settled law the courts of the illegal invaders, let alone the police, have no jurisdiction to dislodge them. The very opposite is the case. The Indians are legally entitled to eject the invaders, and the police are bound at law to protect the Indians in the endeavour. But again the law was inundated and obscured by the bellicose and genocidal hate propaganda of the police and the Attorney General.
From the outset of the said armed standoff it was common knowledge across Canada that the natives were acting upon the basis of the legal opinion given by me concerning their vested right of jurisdiction and possession.
Yet when, eventually, they were arrested by the police I was denied access to them and they to me on the ground that they had other lawyers. The police ushered in legal aid duty counsel to talk to my clients about getting immediate bail as soon as they were arrested and then used that as a pretext for blocking the lawyer-client relationship upon which the jurisdiction issue depends for its presentation and argument. Not only was I denied access to my clients in their cells but my access to the courtroom in which my clients were being arraigned after their arrest physically was blocked by police. I forced my way in. When I informed the presiding judge that I was acting he said I had been dismissed and replaced by other counsel, but refused to allow the clients into the court room to ask them, on the record, who was acting for them. When I filed my clients' written motion objecting to jurisdiction and advised the judge of the treasonable, fraudulent and genocidal character of his jurisdictional assumption, he cited me for contempt, and I was jumped from behind and pressed to the floor by a scrum of police officers, who then The resulting psychiatric report established that the judge's diagnosis was insupportable; that there was no clinical basis whatsoever for an interference of paranoia or any other mental disorder. I was released. I became an exile from Canada on my clients' adamant instructions that I not return to that judge's court room and, in consequence, incarceration. When I failed to appear at the next court date that judge ordered my arrest.