Trial, Week 11: Summary - October 4



   * Day 49: Monday, September 30         * Day 52: Thursday, October 3
   * Day 50: Tuesday, October 1           * Day 53: Friday, October 4
   * Day 51: Wednesday, October 2


Edited by Roz Royce and Trond Halle, from notes by Trond Halle (Defendant)

Posted by FreeMedia

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1996 - DAY 53

Abbreviations used in notes:

DC = Don Campbell (Defense)
SF = Shelagh Franklin (Defense)
GW = George Wool (Defense)
ST = Sheldon Tate (Defense)
MA = Manuel Azevedo (Defense)
HR = Harry Rankin (Defense)

LB = Lance Bernard (Crown)
JF = Jennifer Fawcus (Crown)

J = Judge

Without jury.

GW - says that transcripts from 100 Mile House for OJ's bail review are incomplete. J says that if there is a problem, he asks that transcripts be faxed directly to him, even if they are incomplete.

MA - Re: disclosures. He has just received letter from Crown refusing to disclose the amount of ammo used. Warrant Officer Trelnuk said that Blanc was responsible for keeping track. Blanc said that Trelnuk was responsible. An officer named Laws was supposed to have got the remaining ammo. Crown says this isn't relevant. MA also wants the amount of casings turned in to Zulu. There is a self-defense issue here and a comparison of spent ammo is necessary to show this.

He also wants army officers' notes of Ferguson, Addy, MacDonald, Semianiev. Also wants RCMP commanders' notes of Hall, Lapner, Moulton and Bravner. Says that the Will Say of Kembel is only one page long, and only says he witnessed some exhibits being loaded into someone's trunk. Now there are notes and summaries from Kembel. The summaries are five pages long on legal size paper. This morning, Defense received two page summary of Rick Hall. MA says he's not satisfied with Hall's and Edwards' summaries. They don't reflect who gave the order to blow up the truck. Regarding the no-go zone and the sniper incident on Sept. 12. Kembel says that he gave order to take out sniper. Hall told him of proposed no-go zone and Kembel says that this wasn't confirmed. In a letter from JF to GW, it says that Hall advised subordinates that during discussions between the camp and Elders, the Elders advised the camp that the fence area would be a safe area. This discussion took place on the 10th and the camp rejected it that evening. The next day, another attempt would be tried, but the RCMP would still honour the safe zone. This contradicts Kembel's statement. MA wants their notes. J will let Crown answer in afternoon.

Jury in. J tells them that they will be released after the AB.

JF - Next witness (#51): Cpl. Allan Duplantie (AD) - 17 years on force. On ERT since 1987. Part of Vancouver HQ ERT and was assigned to Gustafsen Lake on Sept. 9. This was Vancouver ERT's second visit to lake, but AD's first.

On Sept. 10, AD spent night at intersection of 1000 Road and Percy's lease with other members of team. Red Bison was with team. He didn't make plan to blow up red truck. His role with his partner Stan Brooks was to arrest a third person of the red truck should there be one. Debolt and Mann were one team. Arnold and Shinkaruk were another.

In early afternoon he was in treeline, west of roadway, 15 metres away from where explosive device was. Bison was in driveway. He and team weren't visible from roadway as they were laying down behind some logs. At 13:50 hours, he heard roar of engine approaching location on 1000 Road. Then heard blast explosion. Following the flying debris, he ran to roadway and noticed huge cloud of dust preventing him from seeing truck. He heard six to eight shots, so he ducked down into ditch. Looking south, he noticed a couple of people move westbound across ditch quickly. First one appeared to be 30-year-old male with black hair to collar. Second male was 30-year-old with blond or brown hair to collar too. Both appeared fair skinned and Caucasian-looking. They went westbound into treeline.

Once people were in treeline he could begin to see truck perpendicular to people, who were five to six yards away from truck. AD was 30 feet from two people. He only saw them for a fraction of a second. Could only see people from the shoulder up, so couldn't see if they were carrying anything.

He waited for the dust to settle. Before that happened, he heard Bison approach and then collision. Then could see Bison and truck nose to nose. One of the members, Preston, got on top of Bison and confirmed no one was in the truck. Two people moved in a quick dash from east to west. As soon as it was confirmed that truck was empty, he told Mercer and Debolt of people. Mercer and dog followed track. Debolt and AD followed. At first it was Mercer, Brooks and himself. Then later, Brooks fell back.

Fifteen to twenty yards into track, he saw magazine on ground with rounds in top. Brooks and Mercer brought his attention to magazine. AD told person behind him, hoping that last person would pick it up. He didn't want to because he was covering dog handler.

Further down track he noticed pair of black gloves and further on, a pink shirt. He can't say how far apart they were, except they were spread out far enough that you couldn't see one from the other's location. He didn't touch these exhibits either.

Eventually, 20 minutes after being on track, they reached Gustafsen Lake. AD was behind dog handler. Dog handler circled around. AD then noticed two people in water bobbing northbound. They didn't appear to be swimming. They were about halfway across lake. Shore to shore at that point was 200 yards, so people were about 100 yards from him.

There were some radio communications by one of the members to Command about situation. AD noticed the sound of gunfire coming from the other side of the lake and a zipping sound above his head. Everyone was in a clutter at this point, standing up. They retreated to some logs to get some cover. Sounded like six to ten shots he heard. Sounded like single shots - not rapid bursts. Sound came from across the lake, but he couldn't see anything to indicate where shots were coming from exactly.

On small aerial photo, he shows location of point on east side of lake where they came out to lake's edge. None of the members returned fire at time. They took cover behind logs and standing vegetation, about 50 feet from lake edge where they originally came out from the end of the track. They were laying down now. AD could still see people in water.

Red Bison arrived at lake with its nose pointed at lake. He could see Preston standing in hatch. Then heard volley of two to three shots and then shouting from Preston. Two people in water lifted hands in the air and started moving towards the Bison. Then heard gunfire that seemed to be coming from further back. Shot occurred when Preston was shouting. Preston was exposed from his waist up. Gunfire was single shots. A number of them.

Preston dropped into Bison and door above Bison closed. Bison turned and went to treeline where it stopped. More gunfire was heard and then Bison went forward into the treeline and disappeared. When Bison was moving to treeline, he didn't see any members standing exposed out of Bison. Can only say there were many rounds, but can't recall if there were different sounds suggesting different weapons.

On small aerial photo, he points to location where Bison was at water's edge, just below triangle of dirt paths. Bison went straight north and entered treeline just a little bit below tip of triangle and Bison was going northeast. This is where he lost sight of Bison. Now watched two people move to shoreline and moved west along shoreline for about 200 yards west. Attention was diverted to treeline by an enormous amount of gunfire.

A second Bison arrived at shoreline and then turned northbound and stopped at treeline where Red had stopped. There was the sound of more gunfire and it disappeared at same location where Red had disappeared.

Two more Bisons came from west and entered treeline at same spot other Bisons entered. Then heard more gunfire.

He's not sure if this happened before two Bisons or after, but saw person crawl along hill, then stood up and ran to treeline. Person appeared to have dark pants and no shirt. Teammates that were engaged in gunfire towards the area of the person brought it to AD's attention. He was then able to see this person. Up to this point, AD had not returned fire.

Team moved a couple of hundred yards west to another peninsula. In original position, he never heard any gunfire other then the initial fire that made them take cover. It took them about 20 minutes to get to second location. On small aerial photo, he shows that he was on next peninsula southwest of first.

From here, he could barely see Bison through trees. He sees smoke around it and then hears an incredible barrage of gunfire. From radio instructions, he fired 15 rounds 75 yards east of visible Bison. He was not concerned about hitting Bison. On photo, he says that Bison was slightly west of area directly north of his location. Treeline provided a backdrop to the Bison.

Following his fire, they retreated a little until they saw the four Bisons leave the area. Team then walked back to driveway of Percy's lease and were picked up by Bison and taken to cattle guard south of driveway. From there, he was helicoptered out. He returned to regular duties in the area until the 17th.

On Sept. 17, he was at blockade on 1000 Road between 1035 and 1029 markers. They used three police vehicles. His job was to observe van as it approached roadblock and to ensure no threat came from it. He understood that Marlowe Sam was driving the van. He was on side of van that didn't have door, so didn't see people come out of it.

He was in area until Sept 20.

HR - AD says that he heard great barrage of gunfire take place after all four Bisons arrived on scene. He had never heard gunfire like this in his life. Figures it lasted a few minutes. AD admits that at this point, he was an observer and not a participant and was not being fired on himself. 15:25 hours, he fired his rounds. The massive gunfire was already occurring at this time. Can only say it lasted several minutes.

AD doesn't know when Red Bison or Green Bison arrived. Can only say when Red pickup was approaching which was 13:50 hours. Moments later he heard the explosion. Thinks massive gunfire ended at 15:45 hours when Bisons all pulled away. Two hours total.

AD says that heaviest gunfire occurred minutes before he fired at 15:25 and lasted until a few minutes after.

He never saw Preston fire shots at swimmers. AD agrees he saw Preston pretty clearly about a couple of hundred yards away. He was also scanning over to people in the water. He heard two or three shots then, but can only say that it came from across the lake from the vicinity of the Bison. Earlier shots included high-pitched whistling sounds past head, indicating they were close by.

AD agrees that he was under some stress. When bullets were whistling past there was a degree of danger, but agrees that he was fairly calm. AD feels that he was under reasonable control to make observations.

MB/ GW - AD agrees that at least both members on each side of him were firing at person on hillside. He knows only that shots were going across the lake. AD saw Preston close hatch and Bison roared off. AD admits he never asked Preston to do this.

DC - Agrees that there was no direct threat to members when they were in their second location. He agrees that two people in water posed no threat to him and agrees it would have been inappropriate to fire on them. Agrees that Bison was facing southbound, as was Preston.

MA - AD says that he saw person on the sand by the waterfront who crawled towards the treeline. Person got up and ran to treeline. He only saw person wearing pants. He never saw person carrying anything or appear to wear a shoulder holster. He was looking with his naked eye.

When he and team first got to lake with dog, he agrees that someone in team radioed the Red Bison. He agrees that he radioed for Bison as soon as he saw the swimmers. He doesn't know where Bison was during radio call. On aerial photo, he first saw Bison just north on lakeshore where lakeshore goes from northwest to due west. Says the time from radioing in for the Bison to the time he saw the Bison was less then a couple of minutes. He says he heard a "bang" with the whistle sounds. MA sees that AD didn't note the "bangs" in his notes. AD confirms that he heard the shots between calling the Bison in and seeing the Bison. He agrees that he can only say that the general direction the shots were coming from was from across the lake. AD only saw Preston out of the hatch. He was carrying his M 16.

MA says that AD's notes are very accurate. AD says that he made note of incident "time blocks" while he was waiting for the helicopter at the cattle guard at 5:00 p.m. Made comprehensive notes the next morning at 8:00 a.m. There was a debriefing on morning of the 12th by force psychologists. AD can't remember if Gates was there. Thinks it was only with the members of his team. Debriefing lasted a half hour to an hour. He made his notes before this debriefing. He understood that Wescam video was shown before he got there.

AD's notes of 10th indicate that there was a quick briefing by Armstrong and Debolt. He understood that Elders were going in and that there was an understanding that camp members caught outside of the fenceline risked capture and arrest. AD says the information was given at 6:25 a.m. about a meeting that was going to take place that day with the Elders at 9:00 a.m. Briefing was very informal outside of hotel in 100 Mile House. He agrees he was aware of a safe zone at this point. AD also says that Kembel said on the evening of the 10th that a ceasefire did not exist.

AD explains that a target of opportunity exists when people expose themselves to police. When it's on "member's call", it means that the authority is downloaded to members to make their own call on how to deal with the people.

On morning of the 11th, there was a discussion about the truck ambush. AD not aware that this kind of explosive had never been used before. He understood that if they believed the people in the truck were armed, they would use data sheet. If people weren't armed, the Bison would pull out and stun grenades would be used. AD agrees that the observer in the aircraft wasn't sure if the people in the truck were armed or not. AD doesn't know what the observer's name was. He agrees that he doesn't recall ever hearing that an occupant was sticking his gun out of the window of the truck.

When he heard whizzing of shots, AD's notes say simply that they were close by and that there were six to ten rounds.

AD never saw a blue vehicle this day. He doesn't know where exactly the Perch was, but doesn't know if there were snipers set up there. Doesn't know offhand where Observation Post 2 was. Doesn't remember the "birdhouse" or "raven". He was never made aware that people were firing on the 11th from the Perch or from Observation Post 2.

When he moved from the first peninsula to the second, the whole group of eight people moved along the treeline next to the lake. AD says that he observed person on first peninsula after his team fired in that direction.

AD says that from second peninsula he saw a Bison on west side of clearing. He says he fired his 15 rounds into treeline. Says that his team fired for a couple of minutes. The other members fired at the same time. He had two 30 round magazines with him that day. He doesn't remember how many rounds his teammates fired.

He received information from Eye in the Sky of people by lakeshore, but they realized team was too far away to get to the people.

At 5:30 p.m., Sept. 12, Kembel gave them a "green light" regarding camp members found outside of the fenceline. MA: "This was a green light to kill." AD: "I disagree with that." MA: "No more questions, your honour."

LB - Next witness (#52): Inspector Roger Kembel (RK) - member since 1965. He is operational officer for entire Lower Mainland. In 1995, he was operational officer for Vancouver, which are 13 Detachments of Lower Mainland area.

On Sept. 5, he was asked to get involved at Gustafsen Lake. He spoke to Johnson who asked him to be available and go to 100 Mile House. He was to be the infield operations commander at Zulu. RK was to deploy ERT throughout area. He would make decisions regarding force to be used. He was responsible for ERT, civilians and dog handlers.

On Sept. 6, he had a briefing at 8:30 a.m. given by Olfert. Recalls Hall, Gates, Bravner, Montague and himself there. He was brought up to speed with regard to negotiations. Role of ERT was to contain area around encampment. Says they had virtually surrounded the area and were keeping camp occupants in there or supporters out.

On Sept. 7, he was working on plan for surrender. This dealt with bringing in a helicopter to area. They wanted to get a Huey which could take a number of people at a time.

Started working at Zulu on morning of the 7th. At 8:30 a.m., he met with Brown and Johnson. Later that day he went to Zulu. Later met with Farrell around 4:00 p.m.

His daily routine was: on scene at 6:00 a.m. and briefed teams; found out what happened day before and would review day's orders; would assign how Bisons were used. Would be in constant communications with Command. There were police negotiators working out of 100 Mile House. At Zulu, they worked out of a motor home which had a monitor inside relaying Wescam's view. This was monitored by him quite often. There was always a member watching this. Aircraft would fly patterns over the encampment and keep note of movements inside the camp.

On Sept. 7, RK was aware that four native Elders from Shuswap Nation were going in. He monitored entire movement of Elders. They would be moved by police car to Zulu and then go to van, which would take them to a tree along the road. Elders would then be picked up by people from camp and taken to camp. Says vehicle most used from camp was blue Oldsmobile.

From 7th to 8th, he checked on ERT and then went to 100 Mile House. He heard that Elders would soon be going into camp. At 9:30 a.m., on the 8th, he heard that Elders were in.

On Sept. 10, 6:00 a.m., he was at Zulu. Elders were going in again. RCMP had decided to tighten the perimeter by moving in closer to camp. They had moved into Percy's lease and had set up an operational plan to stop any vehicles trying to evade arrest. Gates, Bravner, Hall and RK made plan to stop red truck. He had information that there might be some surrenders by some of the people, so they decided to enact plan by placing explosives in the road.

On Sept. 11, there was indication that there would be movement coming from camp. Elders were heading to camp while water barrels were being loaded into red truck. They saw before that when barrels were loaded, the truck would often go to water hole on 1000 Road. RK gave ERT instructions to attempt an arrest should the truck go to water hole or past. He gave instructions to enable the explosives.

Red truck went to log and then went south on 1000 Road until it hit explosives. Truck was disabled and two people were observed on the Wescam monitor running into the woods. He then lost sight of them. RK says that he was not in direct contact with ERT on ground at this time. He was in constant communication with Hall in 100 Mile House. He told Hall that they had blown up truck and ERT members were trying to arrest occupants.

RK heard that two people had made it to the lake and were crossing it. He heard and saw that the Red Bison had gone in and then became disabled. Each time he heard from Red Bison he could hear gunfire, so he told other Bisons to assist. He left it to ERT members in Bisons to figure out a rescue plan on their own. Vehicles were towed to Zulu and then RK reassigned ERT members. Based on incident, he told members to be very careful.

On evening of the 11th at 8:00 p.m., he heard Marlowe Sam was departing with two members from camp. Heard Charlene Belleau was heading to camp. Later in 100 Mile House, at 10:00 p.m., he discussed events with Hall, Gates and Bravner. Following meeting, there was a decision that this was getting serious and perimeter was to be tightened up. Decided to send in a letter of a no-go zone which would say that camp members would be safe if they stayed in their perimeter.

L/ LB cont'd with Insp. Kembel - Following briefing after Sept. 11, there were no changes to the operational plan.

On Sept. 12 at 6:00 a.m., he was at Zulu. He deployed various teams to various locations. At ? a.m., a person was seen walking west on Lion carrying a rifle towards team on west end of lake. He saw this on Wescam monitor. Person had rifle slung over shoulder. Part way down trail, person took off coat and slung it over his shoulder too. He observed person wearing cammo clothes. Person was 600 metres from camp walking westbound. Person was carrying a long barrel hunting rifle. RK could see silhouette of rifle. Person veered off Lakeshore Road and was headed to water. When he took off coat, RK could see a reddish-brown shirt. He then re-slung rifle.

RK had "an expert marksman" across the lake. He authorized sniper to shoot at the person. He recalls seeing a puff of dust go up and then the person ran ten feet to right and jumped into road, spread eagle. RK didn't know of person's injuries, so he started to organize a Bison to retrieve the individual. For 15-20 minutes, Wescam continued to monitor area. When Wescam returned to site, person was gone. RK got radio transmission that person was okay. Wescam looked over campsite, but couldn't make out individual. It was pretty quiet the rest of the day, except when one of the army members was injured.

On the 13th, RK was at Zulu at 6:00 a.m. and deployed ERT. Things were pretty much "status quo". That day, he had a meeting with Johnson at 100 Mile House.

During Sept. 12th incident, he gave "green light" to members. Says that because of incident on the 11th, he was telling members to use overt action to effect any arrests or to protect members or selves. Aware of operational plans from time he arrived, and plans said that members could take any action deemed appropriate. He says this was much the same as the "green light" order.

On the 12th, one person came out of the camp and on the 13th, a couple more people came out. (RK actually has this reversed - two people came out on the 12th and one person came out on the 13th). He was aware of a surrender plan in which Marlowe Sam would escort people who wanted to leave the camp to "Monkey". From there, people would be taken to 100 Mile House. RK says that the RCMP would escort Marlowe Sam to fallen trees at 1035 mark where he would then be picked up by camp members. This was repeated over several days.

RK says the "dream team" referred to Elder group that was being sent in to negotiate.

On the 16th, he was aware of John Stevens. RK calls him a "negotiator" and would be flown in to talk to camp about surrendering. Told this at 7:10 a.m. that day, but Stevens didn't go in that day.

On the 17th, he was aware that the balance of the camp members had "surrendered". Following this, RK had arranged Ivan Dick to go into camp to protect the sacred items until the next day when investigators could get there.

On the 18th, ERT arrived in camp in Bisons and he arrived by helicopter to camp area. A sweep was made of camp.

He returned to regular duties after this.

Video shown of "minute 26" taken Sept. 12 of person walking from camp along lakeshore. Person seen walking and then starts running. He hits the road. Video stopped. RK says that this is what he observed on Sept. 12. He has since seen video. RK says that he can see the rifle that he saw. He notes that the Wescam video link he observed was much clearer.

Video played again and RK says that he can see the barrel. He says that he can see rifle butt just before man slings off his coat. Jury is watching intently, but it's unclear if they see a rifle. None of the Defenders can see it.

HR - (Kembel looks a little tense). RK says that he has slung a rifle before. He says that he could remove coat while slinging a rifle. RK tries to demonstrate. HR suggests that the common sense idea would be to transfer your rifle to one hand and remove your free arm from sleeve of your coat, then transfer rifle to other hand. RK says that this is how it could be done. RK admits that he didn't see this in Wescam video.

RK doesn't believe that man was in no-go zone at the time. Later, he learned that man was in no-go zone, but as far as he knew, the camp hadn't accepted the no-go zone. RK doesn't know if this letter was given to camp. RK admits now that man was in safe zone, but at the time, he didn't know. RK agrees that he was the field commander. Says he was in charge of the ERT in the field. Says there were three commanders and he was number three on the "totem pole". He agrees that he takes responsibility for the decision he made that day. RK admits that whether man had a rifle or not, man was later found out to be in safe zone. RK claims that this zone was in contention. RK agrees that he intended sniper to kill that man. HR wonders what a "green light" means.

RK says that rules of engagement are that a man can protect himself, his fellow members or innocent civilians. Agrees that this is in the Criminal Code and applies to civilians too. HR suggests that RK will say that the man on the 12th fit into the third category in that he posed a danger to others. RK says that police officers were shot in the back before. He felt that man posed a danger to other members. RK says that people were only to be shot if they were armed or approaching RCMP officers. He says that he didn't base decisions only on radio communications, but on Wescam and prior incidents.

RK says that normally, officers only shoot up to 600 metres, but felt expert snipers could take a shot at a 1,000 metres if sniper felt he could make the shot. RK admits he has no idea how far away the ERT members were that this man posed a threat to. Agrees that sniper was well equipped to do the job instructed to do. RK felt he made the right decision. RK denies ever being in a panic.

On the 13th, during his meeting with Johnson and others, he told them that he gave a "green light" to members. Prior to this he said, "This is not a police action, do something now." He was telling Johnson to activate military forces. HR suggests that this sounds like RK was out of his depth. RK agrees this is partially correct. He says that he has well trained ERT members trained to operate in the bush, but the terrain was too vast too handle.

HR says that earlier, there were native officers who were in the camp, getting along well. RK heard of this. HR says that a new mode of aggressiveness then took over. RK says that they were only trying to contain the camp members and hoping negotiations would get them out. He claims that blowing up the red truck happened because natives were moving into the police area. HR wonders if it wasn't clear that the natives were saying this was their land.

RK agrees that they facilitated Bruce Clark to go in there and he hoped that Clark would bring the people out. RK says that he knows now that Clark was telling the natives it was their land and they had a right to make a stand there. RK knows this now. HR wonders if this didn't send a mixed message to the natives. RK won't comment on this.

RK agrees that he knew Clark's position, Mr. James' position, Percy Rosette's position, the Reform Party's position (who was putting pressure on the police.) He also knew of Attorney General, who was in the midst of an election. RK admits that he was one of the most informed people there of all the issues and all the positions.

RK felt it was more like a military operation and that the RCMP were taxed to the limit. RK knows that the army doesn't retire after an eight-hour shift like the police.

RK kept notes and looked over them a number of times in anticipation of giving evidence. On second page, it says "call Sabey", who is person in charge of air operations. Special "I" was a priority to place video camera across the lake.

HR asks what the tactical purpose was of blowing up the truck. RK says that he had been told that the red truck had been used in the majority of shooting incidents, as well as getting water. They decided to take out truck that came into their area. He was only aware that individuals in red truck had fired at helicopter a couple of times. He authorized use of data sheet and ramming of truck with Bison. RK says there was no attempt to kill anyone in the "disabling" of the truck. Only when the person was shot at on the 12th. He agrees it's possible to presume a 14-ton truck barrelling down on you was trying to kill you.

RK says that there was an attempt to get a Supreme Court judge to give them a search warrant to go into the camp. Says that Bass didn't want anyone going into the camp until they had an order. HR says that finally after all this, they decided to do things legally. RK agrees. Snickers. HR suggests that there were no boundaries that the camp had taken over. RK doesn't know if the RCMP ever got the court order or not. He assumes that they did because they eventually did go in and search the place.

RK says he wasn't part of getting four more Bisons.

RK agrees that there were daily discussions about the weather conditions. They were expecting snowfall by the end of October. HR suggests that there was a sense of urgency, but RK denies this. HR says that before the standoff, there were native officers going into the camp and the camp was under the impression that negotiations were going fine. RK admits that he was determined to "end this successfully", even if it meant bringing in the army.

RK doesn't know exactly how many rounds were fired by officers. Says that he thinks there were several hundred to a couple of thousand rounds at most. He would be surprised to hear if there were more. Says that ammo was available from a "storesman", but it wasn't returned to him. Ammo that wasn't spent would stay with ERT teams for future use. There was no accountability to storeman.

He had a note that he called Crown Counsel regarding legal position, but Counsel never called back.

Notes from the 13th - "meet CS Johnson re: DND". This regarded the use of the military. He never called DND, but Johnson did.

Jury and Kembel stood down.

AB/ MA - says he has made his submission already and based on Kembel's testimony, he also wants Johnson's notes.

JF - Says that MA's submission is same as earlier one. Just because there were people in charge doesn't mean that they are relevant.

J says that we just heard that Kembel authorized a sniper to shoot someone, so what she is saying isn't very helpful.

JF agrees that Kembel is in another category and his notes will be made available. The others, however, require more basis than just that they were in command. She says that once summaries are made available, Defense can then ask for particularly relevant points. Says that before, Crown has given notes without any problem.

J asks if there is any further information on the rounds fired and the army officers' notes. He says that he is in the dark regarding the named officers and says the onus is on the Crown to provide information on these people.

MA says that we are in the fourth month of trial. These discussions should have been made months ago. J: "I know." MA wants Hall's notes. There is nothing by Bravner. Regarding army bullets, Crown says this isn't relevant. J says that bullets are on the threshold of relevance. He wants Crown to contact army and get some reports on this. MA says that we only have a summary of Insp. Edwards' notes. It's not his notes. It's a Will Say. We want his notes. We have nothing except summaries of Hall. Wants notes because of discrepancies of safe zone between Hall's and Kembel's notes. JF doesn't find this is necessarily inconsistent. JF not sure if Crown has Hall's notes or not.

J wonders about the notion of constantly going up the scale of command because eventually you get to Ottawa. MA says that Kembel discussed legality of shooting with command group. MA: "They were all in it together."

ST - notes that negotiator Dennis Ryan promised a safe zone to the camp. ST suggests that the Crown provide transcripts of the negotiator tapes for the 10th to the 12th of Sept. The negotiators' tapes would provide specifically what the camp was told and when.

J says that some of ST's position appeals to him. Would like Hall's notes made available. J says that MA will have to say why these people's notes are relevant and then it will be up to the Crown to say why it's not relevant. MA says that Hall will be on the stand soon and he won't cross-examine until he has his notes. J will make Hall's notes available, but wants more information before giving Johnson's notes.

DC - says that Teddy Dick has been absent for the birth of his baby. He can't get money from Crown because he wasn't here. Social Services say he can't have money because he is involved in this case. He can't get a job because of this trial. DC would like to get a compassionate acceptance that he be paid despite his absence. J feels for him and would like DC to inform Jenson (Counsel for the Attorney General) how J feels and hopefully, Teddy can get money without the need for an order.

GW - Has looked at Judge Barnett's judgement from Nov. 10, 1995 regarding OJ's bail. In it, he reads that the problem with OJ is not that he's more dangerous than others, but because of his past criminal activity and comments OJ made that he would go on to other blockades.

LB says that he wasn't there for the bail hearing, but only for the decision. He expected to see the hearing transcripts too.

J asks where the rest of the transcript is. GW says that because of disruptions in the court in that time period, there is a mix-up of transcriptions. GW says what he's getting at is that the court has the power to get an idea of what was going on and the J now has had the advantage of hearing more accurate facts since then. GW suggests that the J base it on what he knows. J wonders if there is no middle ground that can be found other than no money down and no surety. OJ says he has no money. GW says that if OJ could have left before, he would have. J doesn't want someone to remain in jail just because of lack of financial resources. GW says that the Chief of the Semiahmoo Band has offered a place to live on the reserve. J asks that OJ be allowed to get his criminal record from his cell. Stand down.

J and OJ back.

GW - has a plan. That OJ be released on his own undertaking and that he reside in Surrey with John Hill. OJ must also swear in front of his Sundance Chief (John Hill) and the Sundancers to come to this court and not to leave this jurisdiction. OJ would then make this vow on the pipe with John Hill, who was well received earlier by Surrey Pre-trial when he conducted a sweat ceremony for Wolverine.

OJ would also swear to abstain from drugs and alcohol and that order could be made too. OJ is to seek rehabilitation too. John Hill also doesn't allow drugs or alcohol. Suniva would also put up $1,000. This would be a very strong promise. Regarding his criminal record, it was alcohol-driven too.

LB agrees that a person shouldn't be held because of lack of funds, but says that the primary and secondary ground must be considered regarding release. In Barnett's decision, he said he had misgivings releasing him, but because Ms Notnes put forward a large amount of cash and surety, he released OJ. LB notes that Ms Notnes has since withdrawn that surety. LB notes that OJ apparently came from Ontario to join this standoff and has no roots here. His record makes his conditions quite different from others here. These records included failures to appear and other offenses, including a firearms prohibition. There are also two outstanding warrants in Ontario from 1994. This places him in a different position from the others, as did comments he made to an undercover officer that OJ would move on to other events. LB reads from undercover officer's notes that OJ said "they shot up police and helicopters, and police were very scared... This was a war and they will never give up - he'll never give up... He would go on to other incidents, but next time he'd be better armed." LB also reads that OJ said that "this is only the beginning." OJ wanted to get together with the undercover officer to get other guns.

LB says that these comments are what gave Barnett such misgivings, but it was only because of Ms Notnes's assurance that OJ was released. LB says that OJ's past record shows a disregard for court orders.

GW notes that OJ is someone that is quick to test the system. GW says that when OJ was fingerprinted following the standoff, he tested the officers by declining to co-operate, but eventually did. GW: "Basically, OJ has a big bark." Says that OJ never got a hold of this cell plant to get arms. For a year, OJ did nothing illegal, nor did he try to skip bail. He served two months earlier and now has served another two months, which is the same as David Pena served for a similar incident.

J wants to think about it and will give answer on Monday at end of day.

   * Day 49: Monday, September 30         * Day 52: Thursday, October 3
   * Day 50: Tuesday, October 1           * Day 53: Friday, October 4
   * Day 51: Wednesday, October 2